Commentaries

Bridging the Week by Gary DeWaal: April 6 to 10 and 13, 2015 (BCP; Cybersecurity; Alleged Manipulation; Disruptive Trading; Systemic Risks)

Jump to: Bridging the Week    Compliance Weeds    Cybersecurity    Managed Money    Manipulation    My View    Position and Trade Reporting    Position Limits    Trade Practices (including Disruptive Trading)   
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Published Date: April 12, 2015

Different regulators raised red flags last week about the adequacy of business continuity plans and cybersecurity at intermediaries and trading venues, the impact of plain vanilla investment funds on financial stability and the impact of automated trading on government securities markets. Also last week, a private litigant filed a “me too” manipulation complaint against two food processors —copying a complaint filed the prior week by Commodity Futures Trading Commission—, and the Securities and Exchange Commission threw a penalty flag at a former National Football League cornerback for his role in an alleged Ponzi scheme. As a result, the following matters are covered in this week’s Bridging the Week:

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IOSCO Seeks Views on Business Continuity and Recovery Planning by Trading Venues and Intermediaries; NYS Warns on Third-Party Service Providers

The International Organization of Securities Commissions issued two consultation reports on business continuity and recovery planning, including cybersecurity issues—one aimed at market intermediaries and the other at trading venues. IOSCO proposes some baseline standards for both types of entities, as well as for regulators that oversee them.

Separately, the New York State Department of Financial Services issued an update on cybersecurity in the banking sector. It indicated that it will prod banks to improve their oversight of the cybersecurity efforts of their third-party vendors through adoption of new regulations.

Among the specific components IOSCO recommended intermediaries include in their BCPs were (1) an identification of critical business functions and systems, along with primary and backup staff; (2) an assessment of the major threats and impacts considering a wide range of causes (e.g., fire, floods, local protests, terrorism and cyber attacks); (3) steps necessary to ensure clients are able to access their funds and securities promptly in case of a major disruption; (4) identification of dependencies on third-party entities, including clearing and settlement entities; (5) documented procedures for internal and external communications, including with employees, clients, service providers, regulators and other stakeholders (e.g., media); (6) an assessment of funding access and liquidity during a material disruption; and (7) an appropriate governance framework for implementing a successful BCP after a material disruption, among other baseline elements.

In order to protect against cyber attacks, as well as other threats against data, systems and client privacy, IOSCO recommended that intermediaries have a defined security and information technology policy that describes appropriate controls to restrict access to physical assets and information. This policy should address frequent back-up and recovery of data. IOSCO also recommended that intermediaries use back-up data centers to maintain electronic and hard-copy data, and should address the use of firewalls, Internet security and third-party vendors.

IOSCO noted that, although most regulators have at least “some requirements” for intermediaries to maintain BCPs, “it appears there are relatively few jurisdictions that impose the kind of ‘requirements’ with respect to BCPs where failure of a firm to comply might subject it to penalties.” As a result, it urged regulators to formally require intermediaries (1) “to create and maintain a written business continuity plan identifying procedures related to an emergency or a significant business disruption and (2) to update the BCP to reflect material changes in operations or business as well as to assess at least annually whether any other changes are warranted.”

IOSCO made similar recommendations regarding trading venues and the oversight of such entities by regulators. IOSCO specifically recommended that regulators require all trading venues to implement and maintain processes to ensure the “resiliency, reliability and integrity (including security) of critical systems” and a formal BCP.

Comments on IOSCO’s recommendations are due by close of business, June 6, 2015.

Separately, the NYS Department of Financial Services issued a report that identified weaknesses in controls by banking organizations to ensure that their third-party service providers had appropriate cybersecurity measures. According to a survey of more than 150 banking organizations, the NYDFS found that, (1) approximately 33 percent of banking organizations did not require third-party service providers to notify them of information or other cybersecurity breaches; (2) fewer than 50 percent conducted any on-site assessment of their third-party vendors; (3) approximately 20 percent did not mandate third-party vendors to represent that they have minimum information security requirements; and (4) almost 50 percent did not mandate a warranty of the integrity of the third-party vendor’s data or products (e.g., that the data is free of viruses).

My View: It has been often said that there are only two types of financial services firms: those that have experienced cybersecurity breaches and addressed them, and those that have experienced cybersecurity breaches and did not know. Firms should evaluate their cybersecurity measures against objectives standards such as those published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology in February 2014 in its Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (click here to access). Both the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority recently published insightful observations from their reviews of cybersecurity practices at securities industry firms—on both the buy and sell sides. FINRA also identified principles and effective practices firms should consider to address cybersecurity threats. These too should be reviewed. (Click here for details of these studies and recommendations in the article “Industry Watchdogs Warn Brokers and Advisory Firms on Cybersecurity Threats” in the February 8, 2015 edition of Bridging the Week.)

Briefly:

Compliance Weeds: Under ICE Clear rules, clearing members must report by 7:30 p.m. ET each business day (or such other time as the exchange may direct) their open interest in all futures contracts. They are obligated to report any adjustments by 9 a.m. the next business day. (Click here to access ICUS rule 403.) ICE Futures U.S.’s rules also expressly provide that position limits must be complied with both on an end of day and intra-day basis. (Click here to access IFUS rule 6.13.) CME Group has similar rules regarding reporting open positions and compliance with position limits. (Click here to access CME Group rules 561 and 562, respectively.)

And even more briefly:

Compliance Weeds: Rule 17f-6 may be drafted inconsistently with the relevant CFTC rule. It requires that, for an FCM to cary the account of an investment company, it must obtain from a relevant clearing organization an acknowledgment “as required under rul[e] 1.20(a) … that such assets are held on behalf of the [FCM]’s customers in accordance with the provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act” (emphasis added). However, CFTC rule 1.20(a) (click here to access) expressly provides that “a written acknowledgment need not be obtained from a derivatives clearing organization that has adopted and submitted to the [CFTC] rules that provide for the segregation of futures customer funds in accordance with all relevant provisions of the Act and the rules and orders promulgated thereunder” (emphasis added). I wish these provisions tied in better, but they can be read consistently.

And finally:

For more information, see:

Class Action Complaint Filed against Kraft Foods and Mondelez Global for Alleged Manipulation Charged Previously by CFTC:
/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Ploss%20Kraft%20Mondelez(1).pdf

CPOs That Have Delegated Certain Responsibilities to Other Registered CPOs Now Mandated to Tell NFA Formally:
https://www.nfa.futures.org/news/newsNotice.asp?ArticleID=4568

Former NFL Cornerback and Others Thrown Penalty Flag by SEC in Connection With Alleged Ponzi Scheme:
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2015/comp-pr2015-58.pdf

ICE Futures U.S. Settles Disciplinary Actions for Intra-Day Position Limit Violation and Open Position Reporting Errors:

Twin Eagle:
https://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Case.aspx?entityid=0486201&case=2014-067&contrib=ICE
UBS:
https://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/Case.aspx?entityid=0223988&case=2014-143&contrib=ICE

IMF Warns Even Plain Vanilla Investment Funds Add Systemic Risks:
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2015/01/pdf/c3.pdf

See also, SIFMA/IAA Letter to FSOC:
http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=8589953776

Industry Advisory Group Advocates Best Practices to Avoid Disruptive Trading of US Government Debt Securities by Automated Traders:
http://www.newyorkfed.org/tmpg/TMPG%20HFT%20White%20Paper%20FINAL%20-%202015-04-08.pdf

IOSCO Seeks Views on Business Continuity and Recovery Planning by Trading Venues and Intermediaries; NYS Warns on Third-Party Service Providers:

IOSCO:
Intermediaries:
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD484.pdf
Trading Venues:
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD483.pdf
NYS:
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/reportpub/dfs_rpt_tpvendor_042015.pdf

SEC Seeks Comments on Cost Benefit of Rule Permitting Investment Companies to Post Margin Directly With FCMs, Not Third-Party Custodians:
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-04-06/pdf/2015-07754.pdf

The information in this article is for informational purposes only and is derived from sources believed to be reliable as of April 10, 2015. No representation or warranty is made regarding the accuracy of any statement or information in this article. Also, the information in this article is not intended as a substitute for legal counsel, and is not intended to create, and receipt of it does not constitute, a lawyer-client relationship. The impact of the law for any particular situation depends on a variety of factors; therefore, readers of this article should not act upon any information in the article without seeking professional legal counsel. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP may represent one or more entities mentioned in this article. Quotations attributable to speeches are from published remarks and may not reflect statements actually made.

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ABOUT GARY DEWAAL

Gary DeWaal

Gary DeWaal is currently Special Counsel with Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP in its New York office focusing on financial services regulatory matters. He provides advisory services and assists with investigations and litigation.


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